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The  deeper  understanding  Faust  sought  
Could  not  from  the  Devil  be  bought.   
But  now  we  are  told  
By  theorists  bold  
All  we  need  know  is  R 0 . 
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--  Robert  May,  1936-2020   
  
Bob  May’s  limerick  alludes  to  both  the  promises  and  dangers  of  characterizing  epidemic  control  
by  a  single  number.  The  basic  reproduction  number  R 0  is  the  average  number  of  infections  
produced  by  a  single  infectious  person  in  a  population  with  no  immunity.  R 0  has  a  close  relative  
named  the  effective  reproduction  number  R :  the  average  number  of  infections  produced  by  a  
single  infected  person  in  a  population  with  partial  immunity.  In  The  Lancet  Infectious  Diseases 2 ,  
Li  and  colleagues  estimate  how  the  imposition  and  lifting  of  non-pharmaceutical  interventions  
(NPIs)  changed  the  R  number  for  SARS-CoV-2  in  131  countries  in  the  first  half  of  2020.   
  
If  R <1,  an  epidemic  eventually  dies  out  because  each  infected  person  generates  less  than  one  
new  infection.  (This  may  take  a  long  time  if  there  are  currently  many  infections,  like  the  
proverbial  small  rudder  on  a  big  ship.)  However,  when  R >1,  the  epidemic  may  continue  growing.  
R  can  also  change  over  time:  NPIs  such  as  closing  schools,  physical  distancing,  and  mask  use  
can  reduce  R .   Hence  R  is  often  used  to  gauge  whether  pandemic  mitigation  is  working.   
  
Li  and  colleagues  compared  daily  estimates  of  R  at  the  country  level  against  a  database  
describing  which  NPIs  each  country  applied,  and  when.  They  found  that  imposing  NPIs  
significantly  reduced  R ,  but  lifting  them  later  on  increased  R .  School  closure,  a  public  events  
ban,  and  internal  movement  limits--both  when  being  imposed  and  when  lifted--had  the  biggest  
individual  effect,  changing  R  between  7%  and  25%.   
  
NPIs  in  combination  are  even  more  effective.  The  combined  effect  of  school  and  workplace  
closure,  a  ban  on  public  events  and  gatherings  of  10  or  more  persons,  internal  movement  limits,  
and  a  stay  at  home  requirement  reduced  R  by  a  whopping  52%  (CI  29%-68%).  The  R 0   for  
SARS-CoV-2  lies  somewhere  between  2  and  3 3 .  Hence,  early  pandemic  interventions  must 
reduce  R  by  between  50%  and  67%  in  order  to  bring  it  below  one.  The  authors’  estimate  does  
not  include  the  effects  of  contact  tracing  and  isolation.  Despite  this,  the  estimate  suggests  that  it  
might  have  been  exceedingly  difficult  to  flatten  the  curve  in  Spring  2020,  had  the  R 0   for  
SARS-CoV-2  been  a  little  higher.   
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But  R  is  not  without  shortcomings.  Just  as  our  body  mass  index  does  not  tell  us  everything  
about  our  state  of  health,  a  single  number  cannot  provide  a  complete  picture  of  the  state  of  a  
pandemic.   National-level  estimates  can  hide  local  heterogeneity.  Seasonal  differences  in  
contact  patterns  from  Spring  to  Autumn  are  not  captured  by  the  short  time  windows  used  in  
many  epidemiological  studies.  Reporting  delays,  stochastic  effects  and  superspreading 4   can  
also  bias  R .   Moreover,  R  does  not  tell  us  what  proportion  of  infections  are  caused  by  an  
infected  individual  before  symptom  onset.  This  crucial  distinction  for  infection  control  may  
explain  why  SARS-CoV-1  did  not  cause  a  pandemic  while  SARS-CoV-2  did,  despite  their  
comparable  R 0   values 
5-7 .   
  
Li  and  colleagues  discuss  some  of  these  limitations  and  also  raise  the  issue  of  “behavioural  
inertia”.   Timelines  of  decision-making  lend  the  perception  that  governments  can  turn  NPIs  on  
and  off  like  a  switch.   But  in  fact,  populations  can  take  weeks  to  adjust  their  mobility  patterns  in  
response  to  imposition  of  NPIs 2,8 .   This  effect  probably  contributes  to  the  authors’  finding  that  
NPIs  did  not  exhibit  their  maximal  effect  on  R  until  up  to  4  weeks  later.   
  
R  promises  crystal  clarity  in  a  time  when  there  are  no  crystal  balls.  Hence,  the  allusion  to  R 0   as  
a  bargain  with  the  devil.  Statistician  George  Box  has  been  widely  paraphrased  as  writing  “All  
models  are  wrong,  but  some  are  useful” 9 .  I  like  to  re-paraphrase  this  as:  some  models  are  
useful  precisely  because  they  are  wrong.  A  model  including  all  the  real-world  details  of  a  study  
system  would  no  longer  be  a  model,  because  it  would  be  the  system  itself.   
  
Despite  R ’s  imperfections,  the  findings  of  Li  and  colleagues  tell  us  that  NPIs  work,  and  they  tell  
us  which  ones  work  best.  This  is  crucial,  given  that  some  NPIs  have  massive  socio-economic  
impacts.  In  a  similar  vein,  transmission  models  that  project  COVID-19  cases  and  deaths  under  
different  NPI  scenarios  could  be  highly  valuable  for  optimizing  a  country’s  portfolio  of  NPIs 10-13 .  
Moreover,  I  think  R  provides  a  social  utility  that  epidemiologists  easily  overlook.  The  success  of  
large-scale  NPIs  requires  population  adherence.  R  can  stimulate  populations  to  act,  and  gives  
them  useful  feedback  on  the  fruits  of  their  labour.  Perhaps  this  is  one  reason  that  R  has  entered  
our  vernacular  in  2020.   
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Old  material:   
  
Are  their  projected  impacts  of  NPIs  conservative  on  account  of  delays,  saturation?   
  
R  has  entered  the  vernacular  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic  in  much  the  same  way  as  other  
mathematical  terms  have  been  popularized  in  recent  years,  such  as  “tipping”  points”.  (And  in  
fact,  R=1  is  also  a  tipping  point).   
  
If  imposition  of  NPIs  is  also  a  reaction  to  population  movement  that  begins  before  
the  NPIs  become  available,  then  impact  of  NPIs  is  under-estimate,  if  only  because  
the  NPIs  are  a  signifier  of  undercurrents  in  the  broader  population  that  allow--or  
demand--application  of  NPIs.   
  
Superspreading  events  can  not  only  bias  R  estimates.   More   
  
On  the  network  analog  of  a  population  where  superspreading  is  possible  (power  law  network),  
there  are  no  more  thresholds. 5   
  
Second  reason,  pandemic  are  social-epidemiological  phenomena.   Coupled  
behaviour-diseaese  models.  The  idea  that  these  interventions  are  being  put  in  place  
absent  of  changes  in  transmission  are  not  considered.  For  example,  if  there  is  an  
increase  in  transmission  then  some  authorities  may  choose  to  reimplement  
interventions.  This  would  clearly  impact  the  utility  and  interpretation  of  these  results.  
Second  reason  the  estimates  are  conservative.  
  
For  instance,  due  to  stochasticity,  the  sizes  of  outbreaks  tend  to  vary  on  a  continuum  in  the  
vicinity  of  R=1  and  many  outbreaks  can  die  out  due  to  stochastic  effects  even  when  R<1  4   For  
example,  heterogeneity--superspreading.   
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